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Hong Kong is frequently portrayed J as a modern in-
ternational city at the cutting edge of the twenty心rst
century， the so叩 called1¥sian century'. Yet Hong Kong's 
corporate insolvency law remains very much rooted 
in mid-twentieth century England. Indeed， a UK insol-
vency practitioner -or， more precisely， a middle-aged 
UK insolvency practitioner -looking at the winding-up 
provisions of the Companies Ordinance2 in Hong Kong， 
wiU at once be struck as to their apparent similarity to 
the corresponding provisions of the old Companies Act 
1948 (UK). Thus one finds in the Compani悩 Ordinance
('CO') there is no 'Insolvency Ordinance' in Hong 
Kong -not only the familiar distinctions between com町
pulsory and voluntary liquidations，3 but also virtual 
replicas of the old UK provisions on receivership.会For
Hong Kong never troubled itself with replacing receiv-
ership with administrative receiviεrship. then grappling 
with the mεrits and demerits of administrative receiv-
ership in comparison with administration; rather Hong 
Kong， even though stil a British colony at the time of 
the 1986むKreforms， did not take on board either 
administrative receivership or administration. Indeed， 
conspicuously absent from the Hong Kong statute book 
is any modern corporate rescue regime' -despite the 
best efforts of the Law Reform Commission of Hong 
Kong in the mid“1990s." 
The purpose of this article is not to point out that 
UK practitioners han主eringafter the good old/bad old 
days of Centrebinding， phoぞnixcompanies and com-
mittees of inspection not to 服部tionthe absence of 
a statutory licensing system for liquid討。rs-can yet 
盤国麹
relive their formative years in Hong Kong. Rather this 
article seeks to illustrate how regulators and practition-
ers have， in light of the historical origins of the primary 
legislation and Hong Kong' s severe economic downturn 
during 1998-2003， sought to tackle the contemporary 
realities of insolvent liquidations in Hong Kong. The 
conclusion the authors reach is that the funding and 
administrative arrangements now in place for the 
handling of small-or no-asset insolvent liquidations 
in Hong Kong are seriously flawed; and， as a result， the 
integrity of the insolvent liquidation process has been 
damaged. In short. insolvent liquidation in Hong Kong 
is facing a grave crisis. The authors propose that the 
government must immediately rかevaluatethe finaル
cial arrangements for small剛 andno・副部setcases， with a 
vieもIVto providing for increased levels of inv田 tigationof 
such activity by directors of insolvent companies. Better 
policing of wrongful or inappropriate activity by direc-
tors of insolvent co思 panieswill serve as a deterrent to 
other directors and correspondingly improve corporate 
governance standards in Hong 玄ong.
A Insolvent liquidations: an overview 
During the period 1998叩之003Hong Kong experienced 
a severe economic recession. initially tr培geredby the 
Asian financial crisis but later compounded by the out-
break of SARS in the territory. As evidencεd byTableA 
below. there was a significant rise in the level of corpo削
rate insolvency peaking in 2002， and not returning to 
pre-1998levels until2006.i 
1 See， for example， Hong Kong 2005， Chapter 5， Commercc and Industry，を畠vailableぷ <www.year初日k.gov.h主/200S/en/OS_Ol.htm>.
2 Chapter 32. Law目。fHong Kong (Ioseleaf記dition).
3 Voluntary Iiquidations are divided，日目口newould expect. int口むreditors'voluntary liquidations ('CVLs') and members' voluntary liquidations 
('MVI〆).
4 Sce CO. Part Vl: Receivers and Managers. 
5 Thest註tutoryprocedur巴availaちlein Hong Kong is the scheme口farrangement，対日CO.s. 166， whichcloselyresembless. 4之君。fthe Companies 
Act 1985 (UK). Note also Golding andひunn巴γheUs巴ofProvisIonal Li号uidatorsas a Corporate Rescue Tool' (2007) 4 ImernationaI Corporale 
Rescue 75. 
6 Forback露roundse Smart and Booth， 'Reforming Corporat日以escuεProccduresin Hong Kong' (2001) 1 ]o!lrnaI oJ Corporate Law Studies4R5. 
'fhe Companies (Corporate R記scue)BiI 2001， Hong Kong Government Gazette. Legal Supplemcnt 1¥'0. 3， C615 (18 May 2001) w詰scventually 
誌も註ndoned滋ndthere is no prospect of the introduction of a statulory corporate rcscuc mechanism in Hong Kong iぉthenear future. 
7 'fhe figures紅白抑制ぬるlevia the Oficial Receiver's website， se官<www.oro.gov.hk>.
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Following the 怠nglishmodel， insolvent liquidations in 
Hong Kong fal into two categories: compulsory liqui-
dation and creditors' voluntary liquidation ('CVL'). But 
whereas in England8 the average ratio of compulsories 
to CVLs is roughly 1:2 so that the CVL is the typical in-
solvent liquidation in Hong Kong the situation is very 
much the opposite. In Hong Kong， compulsories far 
outnumber CVLs. The ratio in rece誠 yearsis roughly 
5:1. Thus. for instance. in the period之002-2005the 
average annual number of CVLs was 247Y Therefore， 
broadly speaking， whereas in England for every 1，000 
compulsories you would expect 2，000 CVLs， in Hong 
Kong for every 1，000 compulsories you have historiω 
cally had 200 CVLs. The overall comparison， therefore， 
is that it is 10 times more likely to have a compulsory 
in Hong Kong when compared to England. As a con-
sequence. the involvement of the court in insolvent 
liquidations in Hong Kong is far more a feature th絞殺
in England. IりHowever，although at first blush it might 
bethought出atgreater court involvementもrouldlikely 
result in a more careful scrutiny of the liquidation 
回盟謹彊
process， including a most thorough investigation of 
the causes of the failure and the conduct of the direc“ 
tors， the reality in Hong Kong is very different in the 
vast majority of insolvent liquidations. 1 
Interestingly， the CO does contain two innovations 
in relation to CVLs that were never found in the English 
legislation. First. there is a power in the court to allow 
a compulsory liquidation to be converted into a CVL.12 
This power derives from a recommendation made in 
1962 in the UK by the Jenkins Committee， 13 but never 
acted upon there. The main reason for seeking conver-
sion is to avoid the ad valorem fees levied by the Official 
Receiver ('OR') under the legislation.14 Nevertheless， 
despite the prospect of considerable savings in costs， 
the courts have laid down strict rules on conversion and 
the power is in fact rarely exercised.15 Secondly， there 
are currently more ways to commence a CVL in Hong 
Kong than in England. For section 228A of the CO， ini-
tially introduced in 1984， allows the board of directors 
to place the company into CVL without first resorting 
to the shareholders in general meeting. However. case 
law， 1 O coupled with more recent legislation， 17has made 
it expressly clear th滋 section228A may only be used 
in exceptional circumstances: where no other method 
of placing 品。companyinto liquidation is feasible. Not 
surprisingly， therefore， there are but a handful of CVLs 
commenced under section 228A each ye肌
The relatively infrequent use in Hong Kong of Cももs.
in comparison to compulsories， has already been 
noted. There are. no doubt， several reasons why CVLs 
are comparatively under-used. Cultural factors may 
well have a role to play. Putting a company into CVL 
requires its directors 18 (and. normally， shareholders Jl9 
to acknowledge the realities of their companyな plight.
It may be. in an Asian culture. that such actions in-
volve a significant loss of 'face' certainly， anecdotal 
evidence would suggest that many. if not most. Hong 
Kong businessmen would prefer to soldier on， in the 
vain hope that somehow the company's fortunes will 
8 Details c註nbe found on the l米 InsolvencyS日rvicewebsitε. se <www.insolvency.gov.uk/otherinformation/statistics/statisticsmenu.htm> 
守 Detailsarc av註ilableon the Comp註niesRegistry website. se <www.cr.gov.hk/en/statistics/statistics_05.htm>. 
10 This is particularly the case since. although rule 198 of theぐompani凶作tVindinglゆ)Rules ('CWUR') allows the Offiαal Receiver， where there 
is no committee of inspection， toexercise the functions normally given to the ωmmitt問。finspe吃tion，th日practice01' the Ofticial Receiver ha語
版印toleav巴suchmatters to the court alone 
l1S巴ethe discussion of Funding and Inv剖 tigationof Summary Cas巴s.below. Section B 
12 CO. S. 2091える
B Cmnd 1i4争.See also Re Conso Electronics (Far East) Ltd [1ヲ 5J2 HKC 32i白
1壬Companies(Fes and Perc日ntageslOrder (Cap 32C). Sch巴dule3. TableB. 
15 Se忍， in particular. Re Peregrirte l'ixed Income Ltd [1守サ8)4 HKC 1き1.
16 Note Bozell Asia (Holding) Ltd v CiiL International Lld [199 i]l HKLRD1 and SEG InVl~slment Ltd v SEG InlemationaI Securilies (HK) L!d [200勺
HKCFI 65i (14 October 20(5) at para 19: '[s.228A] is not to be invoked盆twil or arbitrarily. It is設ota choice of convenience. It is an escape 
when any other mode目。fwinding-up under the Comp設niesOrdinance is [sicl impracticablc if not impossiblc'. 
1 7 For details.総 eBultenvortrzs Honfl Kong Company Law Handbook. 8th edn. p. 942-945. 
18 For directors wil normally be required to summon the meetings of shareholders in order to pass a special re普段lutionto wind up voluntarily. se 
Co. s. 228( 1). 
19 Although， as noted above. s. 228A bypasses th詑needfor a shareholders' meeting b日forethe company can be put into CVL. 
t 
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turn around， than act early (and in the interests of 
the general body of creditors) and initiate a CVL. This 
is， at times compounded by the fear of the son (or 
grandson) of the founder of a company to be seen as 
having destroyed what his father (or grandfather) had 
created. The fact that Hong Kong has no legislation 
on insolvent， or wrongful， trading may also be noted 
in this context.20 The CO does， of course， deal with 
fraudulent trading，21 proof of which has always been 
difficult. Moreover， in 2000， when a Bill containing 
insolvent trading provisions was before Hong Kong's 
legislature，22 Lord Hoffmann in the Hong Kong Court 
of Final Appeal. in the Wheelock Marderz case，21 made 
it clear that the fact that credit was incurred at a time 
when there was no reasonable prospect of creditors be-
ing paid was， of itself， insufficient to establish liability 
for fraudulent trading: liability depended upon proving 
dishonesty. In sum， there few incentives， or sanctions， 
to encourage the timely use of a CVL in Hong Kong. 
Indeed， as will be seen below， the administrative 
regulation of compulsory liquidations of insolvent 
companies may even encourage less than scrupulous 
directors to avoid using the CVL procedure and trade 
on as long as possible.24 
Another factor， and in the authors' view， a sig-
nificant factor， when it comes to the high proportion 
of compulsories has been the distorting effect of work-
ers' wages protection legislation in Hong Kong. In the 
mid・1980sthe Protection of Workers on Insolvency 
Fund ('PWIF') was estab!ished by legislation in Hong 
Kong.25 When an employer goes bust -to use a neutral 
expression -workers may apply to the PWIF for pay-
ment of wages， wages in lieu of notice and severance 
payments. Payments from the PWIF are made on an ex 
gratia basis and the PWIF is funded not by employees' 
contributions but by an annual levy on every busi-
ness registration certificate issued by government.26 
-14-
However， the significant point in this context is that 
the major payment provision under the legislation， 
namely s.16(1)(b). is expressed to operate not where 
the company has become insolvent， or entered into an 
insolvency procedure， but where a winding-up petitioη 
has been presented. Receivership or commencing a CVL 
will not trigger the relevant provision. 
Indeed， cases have not infrequently arisen where 
workers present a petition， even though a CVL has 
already been commenced， simply in order to get their 
PWIF applications moving forward.27 Hence Rogers 
J， in 1995， in Re Rena Gabriel HK Ltd28 devised a par-
ticular procedure to deal with this scenario: essentially， 
to avoid the unnecessary costs of converting the CVL 
into a compulsory， the court ordered that the worker's 
petition should stand over until the company was dis-
solved at the completion of the CVL， whereupon the 
petition would be automatically dismissed (without 
further court involvement). Moreover， although there 
is an additional power under s.18 (1) of the legislation 
which enables the PWIF to make payments where no 
winding-up petition has been presented， provided in回
ter alia that the company has less than 20 employees， 
the statistics reveal that this power has historically 
only been exercised in a relatively small percentage 
of workers' applications. For example， in the financial 
year 2004-05， although out of 1，621 suspected in-
solvency cases 1，470 involved businesses29 with less 
than 20 employees， thereby potentially falling within 
the addi tional power under s.18 (1)，30 less than 15 % of 
workers' applications were actually dealt with under 
s.18(1). In 2005・06，out of 1.159 suspected insol-
vencies， 1.072 involved businesses with less than 20 
employees (i.e. the vast majority of failed businesses); 
in the same period， the Fund approved 9，819 applica-
tions from workers， but only 1.245 of those were dealt 
with unders.18(1).1l 
20 Att巴mptsto introduce insolvent trading as part of the Companies (Corporate Rescue) Bill2001. se n. 6 above， failed目 Forthe earlier attempt. 
in 2000. se n. 22 b巴low.
21 CO.日目 275目
22 The proposal was originally contained in the Companies (Amendment) si1l2000. Hong Kong Government Gazette. Legal Supplement No. 3. C5 
(7 January 2000) and later re-introduccd as part of the Companics (Corporatc Rcscuc) sil 2001. sc also n. 6 above. 
23 Aktiese/skabat Dansk Skibsfinansiering v Brothers [20011 2 BCLC 324. [200011 HKC 511. 
24 Hoping that the case wil then fal into the category of 'summary cases' and be parcel巴dout under th巴PanelT scheme， discussed below. 
25 Protection of Wagcs on Insolvency Ordinance. Chaptcr 380. Laws of Hong Kong (looseleaf cdition). 
26 Currently. the levy is HK$600 (the equivalent of US$77: at an exchange rate of US$l = HK$7.8トTh巴P仇IFalso has a right of subrogation in 
relation to payments madc to workcrs. Dctails as to the operation and funding of the PWIF can be found in various Annual Reports produced 
by the PWIF. se for example the Annua/ Rど'Port2οοιο6 available at <www.labour.gov.hk/eng/public/wcp/AnnuaIReport05-06.pdI> 
27 Although recent changes in the administrative proc巴duresadopted by th巴 PWIF.se text to n. 42 below. may make this scenario les 
common 
28 [1995J2HKC273. 
29 This would include both unincorporated and incorporated businesses. 
30 See PWIF Annua/ Re'Port 2οο4イj号.p. 16 (<www.labour.gov.hk/巴ng/public/ wcp/ AnnualReport04-0 5. pdf> ).Th巴numb巴rof applications to the 
PWIF where a winding-up petition had been present巴dwas 11.529; whilst the number of applications where a bankruptcy petition had been 
presented (in respect. obviously. of an unincorporat巴dbusiness) was 1.876. The number of applications dealt with under s. 18{l) was 1.955. 
31 P仇IFAnnual Re'Port 2οヲーο6.n. 26 above. p.16. 
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That the詑 levantsection of the PWrF legislation rゃ
fers only to the presentation of a winding-up petition. 
but not to CVL or receivership. might seem more than 
a litle surprising. particularly as the original study. 
in 1983香 thatled to the establishment of the PWIF 
was entitled: Report of the Working Group on Problems 
Experienced by Workers of Companies in Receivership.3之
However. the reason why only a winding-up petition 
is specified appears to have its origin in the 1983 Re-
port itself. For the Working Group. when considering 
whether an application to the proposed Fund should 
be triggered only by the presentation of a winding-up 
petition. concluded: II 
'While we are aware that employees affected by 
voluntary liquidation or in [sic] private receivership 
may experience some delay in obtaining payment 
of wag斜 andother employment entitlements， en-
quiries by us suggest that non-payment of wages 
due to employees in these circumstances are rare. 
The affected employees are usually paid their wages 
promptly or at a fairly early stage of the winding upl 
private receivership proceedings by the liquidatorsl 
receivers. Our enquiries indicated that there were 
few cases where compromises WIぽ enot reached 
with employees and they were not paid. We believe 
that the exclusion of these situations will have the 
positive effect of influencing liquidators/receivers to 
make prompt settlement of the employees' claims. 
Since voluntary liquidation/private receivership is a 
common way to windぺlpa company and to meet al 
its obligations (particularly. for voluntary liquid，αtion. 
w/tere thεcompαny is solvent) and is used very widely， 
we do not think that voluntary liquidation cases and 
private receivership should be covered.' 
These observations are quite startling.制 theyseem 
completely to ignore the distinction between an MVL 
and a CVL. MIIもshave been， as one might expect， rela-
tively common in Hong Kong， H but CVLs were and are 
not. More significantly. in an乱れlLal creditors should. 
of course. be paid in ful and the liquidator can be ex-
pected promptly to deal with. and where appropriate 
reach a settlement in respect of. the claims of employ幽
語圏璽冨
32 June 19持3.The Working Group Report is on file with the authors. 
33 Working Group Report. p. 70. 
eεs. In a CVL. on the other hand. the liquidator simply 
cannot pay al the workerダc1aimsin ful: the company 
is insolvent! PreferentiaI claims may， in an appropriate 
case.35 be paid reasonably promptly in a CVL -but the 
main issue. as far as workers are concerned. is that 
the amounts that can be c1aimed from the PWIF curω 
rently far exceed the level of preferential claims.36 For 
example. the preferentiaI debtl7 under the CO in respect 
of wages in lieu of notice is capped at HK$2.000. yet 
HK$22. 500 may be sought from the PWIF; for unpaid 
wages the figures are HK$札000and HK$36.000 
respectively. Quite simply. workers' claims in CVLs do 
present obvious practical problems -which is precisely 
the reason why the court in Re Rena Gαbriel HK Ltd had 
to devise a strategy to deal with workers presenting a 
petition. against a company already in CVL. for the sole 
purpose of triggering the PWIF. 3話
Indeed. the following scenario has over the last two 
decades been common in Hong Kong悶 dserves to 
illustrate the practical relationship between the La-
bour Department ('LD'). the PWI主総ndthe Legal Aid 
Department ('LAD'). Upon finding that the employer's 
premises are c1osed. the workers will sεek assistance 
from the IJ)， Within a relatively short period of time. 
the workerダ claimswill be adjudicated upon by the 
Labour Tribunal. Assuming that the Labour Tribunal 
tinds that wages and/or other entitlements are owed， 
a象representative'worker -one who， in particular. has 
virtually no assets or property and therefore meets the 
LegaI Aid 0吋inance39requirements -will be chosen 
to apply for legal aid. In due course. after a legal aid 
certiticate has been granted. the LAD will presεnt a 
winding-up petition;40 payment c釘1then be expected 
to be made from the PWIF within a matter of a few 
weeks. The LAD's expenditure in respect of wages 
c1aims amounted to HK$13.88 million in 2003-04. 
HK$1O.48 million in 2004・05and HK$7.63 million 
in 2004-05，41 
The decline in the LAD's yearly costs in relation to 
W暗部 claimsmust be seen against the background of 
the steady improvement in the economy sinceユ004.
However， in an apparent response to criticism of the 
inefficiency of the system. a number of administrative 
changes have recently been introduced to streamline 
34 Between 2002 and 2005. roughJy 900 MVLs昨ereco立1m記ncedeach year. se <www.cr.gov.hk/むnlstatistics/日tatIslics_05.htm>‘
35 I.e. where the liquidator has suficient asets to pay the preferential cr日ditorsafter retaining 8uch sums as might be necessary to cover the costs 
and expenses of the winding up (i註cludin蕗investigations):8e. lurther. Re ~もl111iam Lawe (Chi円a'frade) Ud [19ヲ4]3HKC 503. 
36 This has c位協edcomment in the past. se for instance 5t開 dingCommittee on Company Law Reform. 10th Report (1993). p. 31-33守
37 Preferential debts fal within CO. s. 265. 
38 Although recent changes in pr品cticemay result in les8 need for workers to present a pctition where a company has already been placed治to
CVL， se text to n. 42 bclow. 
39 Ch詰pter事1.Law of Hong Kong (Iooseleaf edition). 
40 See also text to n. 42 below for recent developments. 
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the processメぷ Firstly.where a company is already 、nder伊 ingvoluntary liquidation叫-which must 
prεsumably be taken to mean a CVL -and there are 
les than 20 employees. the case need not go through 
the LAD. In other words. it would now appear that 
where there is a CVL. the PWIF will start from the 
assumption that the case will fal under the s.18(1) 
additional power. Therefore. in most instances where 
a company is already in CVL. the new streamlined prか
cedure should obviate the need for workers to present 
a petition and for the court to apply the Re Rena Gabrie1 
HK Ltd approach. Second. and more broadl:ぁinsteadof 
generally req uiring the workers to obtain a Labour Tri-
bunal award before being referred to the LAD to apply 
for legal aid to take winding-up proceedings， the LAD 
will process an application if there is reliable evidence 
as to: (i) the amount owed to the worker; and (i) the 
closure of the employer's business.44 
Turning briefly to corporate rescue， itwill be noted 
that where a financially troubled company is attemptω 
ing to re欄 structureits operations. any unpaid workers 
who have been. or expect to be， laid off can be antici働
pated to seek to present a winding-up petition so as to 
trigger applications to the PWIF. even though this may 
complicate the rescue effort and in turn impact adω 
versely upon the interests of (former) colleagues who 
are hoping to be kept on in the restructured bus於hぬle部s
οωf 、the c叩ompa創加加ny，μ4@
Oωf the PWへNI即Fwas not to make payments 一pa句符ymηlen殺1t総$ 
are， of course， ex gratia under the Hong Kong legislル
tion where a petition had in fact been presented but 
attempts were being made to rescue the company and 
avoid it being liquidated.46 The argument of the PWIF 
was that it should not be subsidising the rescue of fi網
nancially troubled companies. 
信溜露間
All in al. the present overall PWIF structure prompts 
workers to petition as soon as possible and. by the same 
token， encourages other unsecured creditors to sit back 
and wait for Legal Aid to pick up the bilL Not surprisingly. 
therefore. the statistics reveal that the Director of Legal 
Aid has historically been the single largest petitioner of 
any individual. group or sector in Hong KongY 
However， the major cause for concern in relation 
to insolvent liquidations in Hong Kong today is not by 
whom a winding-up petition is presented事 butrather 
what happens in the majority of cases after a winding曲
up order has been made. 
B. Funding and investigation of summary cases 
1. The introduction of the Panel T scheme 
Prior to administrative reforms commencing in the 
mid側 1990s.most compulsory liquidations in Hong 
笈ongwere dealt with in-house， with the OR appointed 
as the liquidator. (Although it was always possible 
for the creditors to have the court appoint a private 
liquidator. assuming suitable arrangements for pro剛
fessional fees could be concluded.) In 1996 a new 
scheme was introduced. under which larger corporate 
in語olvencycases would be distributed. on a roster ba-
sis. to experienced private practitioners appointed to a 
panel established by the OR. This became known as the 
'Panel !¥ scheme.制 Asthese cases generally involved 
substantial assets. the remuneration and costs and 
expenses of the liquidator did not present insuperable 
difficulties. In 1997 a so-called 'Panel B' scheme was 
introduced. Under the Panel B scheme some ‘summary 
cases'一thosewith assets worth less than HK$200.000 
42 DetaU器areprovi品edin the Legal Aid Services Council Annual R♂port 200ふ06(se <www.info.gov.hk/Jascllasc0506/eng/operationaI8.html> ):
'To facilitate spedier ex gratia payment， [itwasj agre記dthat th程foJJowingthre types of cases need notちerefered to LAD 
C住吉eswhere bankruptcy/winding up petitions hav若島Ireadybeen isued; 
Cases where bankruptcy/winding up orders have already been granted; 
Cases where the number of employees is les th註n20紛 dthe employer is a Iimited company undergoing voJuntary Iiquidation， 
Hitherto 1，D would refer employ凶 sin the above type of cases to aply for legal and to take winding up or bankruptcy予防cedings.むnderthe 
new arrangement， the cases need not be refered f()r legal aid.' 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid:・Inadition， it w出 agreedthat employees would not be required to obtain a Labour TribunallMinor Employmentα泌総話 Adiudication
Bo日rdAward b日forethey were refered to LAD to aplyおrlegal aid to take winding-up or ban孟ruptcyproc総 dingsif th勾Ih議 documentary
prof of empJoyment and the amount owed， or if there were reliable sources of information such as media reports showing that the employer 
company had c10sed down or had ceased busin巴8日J
45 For further details， se Smart and Booth 'Provisional Supervision and れlorkers'Wag巴s:An Alternative Proposal' (2001) 31 Hong Kong 1，aw 
Journ担J188. 
46 The practice has been criticized in the Court of Pinal Appeal， se per 1，ord Mil日tin Re UDL Holdings Ltd l2002jl HKC 1ア2at 185-1>. 
47 Se， e.g. Oficial Rec理iver'sOftice. AnnuaI Report 1994-95， Annex 5A: in 1994-95 the Director of Legal Aid presented 38.7% of al予告titions哩
tr註必cr吋itors28，ら%.banksor且nanciaJinstitu tions 18.4% and landlords 4.5%. 
生詰 Fordet註i1s，se Public Accounts CommiLLee ('PAC') Report No. 34 (June 2000)， para 52. The PAC Report was a folow up to th日AuditCom-
misi開設.eportNo 34 on the Services Provided by the OJjicial Receiver's Of1ce (Man:h 20(0)， available at < www.aud.gov.hk/eng/pubpcarpt/ 
ゅに34，htm>，Infi詮ct.i詮recent years.ζF符菅吋d必itぬorおs[治ntl恥1潟記iぬ総r湾g記佼ri泌r股15凶s
rぬ品tめhe絞rtめb説E設lr犯el珍yl込lpor註lP註E怠lelA主¥.with the reSlむIl込Llhal t泳her代宮ar伐恕 E段10斡W帯 veryfew Panel A ap干ointmentseach year 
'1.7 'n'ロTη2・iハ n訓 r町内戸、ハr::>toR倫晶、'"， 1::m"， 4 k~l ，: r; 
Philip Sm昌rt，
in which no dividend to creditors is expected were 
parceled out to the private sector.49 
A summary procedure for U守口idationswas ゑrst
introduced in Hong Kong by amendment to the CO in 
1976; the objective was to streamUne the liquidation 
process so that companies with negligible assets might 
be wound up in as cost effective manner as possible. 50 A 
summary process for bankruptcy cases was， of course， 
contained in the Bankruptcy Act 1914，51 and appears 
to have been the model for the Hong Kong legislation.号2
However. the innovation in 1976 in Hong Kong was to 
make provision for a summary procedure In respect of 
bankruptcies mzd liquidations: there was no like regime 
for liquidations in the Companies Act 1948， or， ind悦 d.
the Insolvency Act 1986. Summary liquidation case器
were. prior to Panel B， al handled by the Official Rゃ
ceiver's Office ('OROV3 
lnitially. firms taking up Panel B cases could expect a 
maximum fee of HK$60.000 per case.54 Significantly. 
the HK$60.000 fee does not appear to have been 
plucked out of thin air. In response to a守uestionfrom a 
member of Hong Kong's Legislative Council， the Secre-
tary for Financial Services (Acting) gave the followin怒
written response in September 1998:きち
'The Official Receiver does not keep separate st凶器削
tics about the costs of cases because each insolvency 
ca認 isunique. However. based on the minimum level 
of statutory investigation required and the standard 
procedures to be completed in each and every case. 
it is estimated that for an insolvency case with aル
sets not exceeding $50.000. which represent 74.5~も
of the compulsory winding-up cases and 90% of 
the bankruptcy cases handled by the Of恥ial1えか
ceiver's Office. the average cost to the office is about 
$54.400. For cases with assets between $50.000 
and $200.000. the average cost is about $138.000. 
翻躍露掴
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The actual costs， of course， vary， depending on com“ 
plεxity and circumstances.' 
The above figures do not distinguish between windings-
up and bankruptcies， so it is not possible to be precise. 
Yet the average cost of a winding up (a quarter of 
which fel within the HK$50，OOOωHK$200.000 aシ
set category) would seem to have been in the region 
of HK$75.000， on the basis of these figures. What 
is. perhaps， more important is that these匂uresarε 
expressed to be based on the minimum level of stαtutory 
investigation required. A slightly higher figure. in the rか
gion of HK$80，OOO， can be deduced from an analysis 
of Appendix E of the Audit Commission Report on the 
Official Receiver's Office戸 thisfigure may be somewhat 
morεaccurate since the Audit Commission Report does 
distinguish between bankruptcies and windings心 p.
In any event. the HK$60.000 fee was reduced in 
late 1999 to HK$40，OOOY Subsequently， Panel B was 
wholly replaced by a competitive tender process， after 
doubts were exprεssed刊 asto the legality of the Panel B 
arrangements.59 Under the tender system now comω 
monly known as多PanelT' -a firm (of accountants， 
solicitors or company secretaries) indicates to the ORO 
how much the firm would ‘charge' to handle a specified 
batch of cases. In relation to both the 2001 and 2002 
tender exercises， one law firm went so far as to submit a 
HK$O amoun仁川 Thefollowing table sets out the aver-
age tender price of summary cases based on successful 
bids as indicated by the ORo. 
49 Also on a roster bases. ibid. f王K$200.000is the e屯uiv註lentof aゃproximatelyUS事25.650(uS$l = HK$ 7ι). 
50 In particul品r.the summary procedur己 doesaway with thc n誌記dfor any meet担19S01' creditors or contributories. as well as the committee of 
inspection: CO. s. 22 7F(l)(b). 
51 Bankruptcy Act 1ヲ14.s. 129. 
52 Per Kwan Jin Re Goldlory Reslauranl Ltd [2006]3 HKLRD 331 at para 10. 
き3Details of the (shortl life of the Panel B scheme can be found in Re Newsweb lnternationaI Ltd [2007] HKCFI 411. parasふ13.per Barma 1.
54 PAC Report. para 52. HK$60‘000 is the equivalent of approximately US$7. 690 (USS1 = HK$7.8) 
55 Hong Kong Legislative Counci1. Qficial Record of Proceedings. W日dn日sd日早 9日eptemb巴r1998 (in response to a question from Mr Eric Li Kか
Cheungト
きら Se定 n.48 above. Taking both active and completed summary windings-up into consideration. 
57 PAC Report. para 54. 
58 For details of the history. se Re Newsweb lnternational Ltd. n. 53 aboνe. 
59 Under Panel B private practilioners had be日nappoint日das 'agents・ofthe OR. but without replacing the OR as the of詰ceholder. Douち総 W巴re
expressed. see n. 53 above. as to whether the OR could validly delegate his duties as an oflice holder in this manner. Legislative amendment in 
2000 opened up a diferent avenue. In Hong Kong. as under the Comp誌niesAct 1948 (UK). the OR typicaly b記camethe provision昌li母校idator
of every company upon the making of a winding-up order and remained as thむprovisionalli弓uidatoruntil such time as the court appointed 
aliquid品tor.The 2000 amendment (se now CO. s. 194( lA)) speci自f詰lypermitted the OR. in a case where the空ropertyof the comp説nywas 
not Iikely to exceed HKS200.000. to appoint one or more persons in his place as provisionalli号uidator.In a summary case. the 0及。rthe 
provisionalliquidator (as from the之000amendm切りautomatic説lIybecomes the li号uidatorwhen the court m註kesthe summary order (CO. s， 
227F(1)(b)(i))ー
60 Information as to suεcessful bids is available via the ORO weち泌総:<www.oro.gov.hk/eng/tender/tender.htm>‘ 
t 
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(HK$3.100 is approximately US$400 or E200 at current 
exchange rates (June 20(7)) 
Technically， the way in which remuneration is provided 
for under Panel T is somewhat more complicated than 
a simple fixed fee，61 Firstly， the starting point is that the 
liquidator's remuneration is calculated according to 
a time C08t basis.ωSecond， however， in most， but not 
al. cases as there are negligible assets. the amount of 
assets realized by the liquidator will not be sufficient 
to cover those professional fees. Therefore. third， the 
government agrees to subsidi問 theliquidator. but only 
to the extent indicated in the tender bid made by thε 
office holder' s firm.'" For example， the lowest successful 
bid in the 200か07exercise was HK$333.000 for an 
estimated batch of 180 cases amounting to an aver“ 
age subsidy of HK$1，850 per case; whilst the highest 
successful bid was HK$789.840 an average subsidy 
of HK$4，388. The average figure. taking al successful 
bids into account， was HK$3.100.M 
In addition to the subsidぁafirm submitting a bid 
毘 ightanticipate that out of every 180 or so cases 
there will be a few where a significant level of assets are 
recovered， so that al or most of the liquidator's remu-
neration on a time cost basis.部 wellas the costs and 
expenses.むanbe satisfied out of such recoveriεsin those 
partiωiぽ cases.However. in practice such remunerル
tive cases are inevitably few and far between because. 
部 ageneral matter， a case only gets allocated to Panel T 
once the ORO has made the initial assessment that the 
company has limited. if an手assets.In particular. it ap-
pears that in over 85% of al summary liquidations the 
levelof assets is less than HK$50.000 and the average 
町商璽・
amount ofωsets， from which fees might in theory be 
paid， in such cases is less than HK$2.800.65 Moreover， 
for every case where significant assets are uncovered as 
a result of investigations， there might be several others 
that look potentially promising， and upon which a great 
many billable hours might be expended， but in respect 
of which nothing is actually recovered at the end of the 
day. In such cases， the liquidator wiU only be entitled 
to the appropriate subsidy which might well not even 
cover the costs and expenses of the liquidator. 
But， perhaps more importantly. the possibility of 
a remunerative case depends solely upon potential 
assets. Hours of investigation spent in uncovering mas-
sive governance failings and gros諒 negligenceon the 
part of the directors will not lead to payment of profes-
sional timεcost fl侃 sunder the Panel T set嶋略委 unless
significant assets are also recovered. Even uncovering 
the wrongful diversion of assets from the company， in 
flagrant breach of duty. will not pay the bil where， as 
is not infrequently the case. the delinquent directors 
have fled to Taiwan， Mainland PRC. or elsewhere. hav-
ing removed whatever assets there may have been from 
Hong Kong. The issue of incentives needs hardly be 
laboured. 
In support of the Panel T scheme， it could be argued 
that a firm which has spare capacity might at least 
generate some income (the subsidy + fees from any 
remunerative cases) rather than have staff sit idle 
doing nothing in slack periods， However， the authors 
approach this argument cum grano salis. Logic and corrト
monsense make it difficult to accept that a subsidy of 
HK$ 3 ，1 00 provides an adequate incentive for a frrm to 
invest tens (and. where required. hundreds) of biUable 
hours of work … especially at Hong Kong professional 
rates， which are among the highest in the world. It is 
particularly important to bear in mind that in 85% of 
summary cases there are negligible assets and there 
will be virtually no chance of recovering anything; 
albeit there will bε15% of cases where there are some 
assets (between HK$50.000 to r王K$200.00斡J市 In
respect of this latter group ofωses. but not the former. 
it will make commercial sense to carry out perhaps not 
an extensive. but an appropriate level of investigation 
(appropriate to the amount of available assets. that is); 
61 Afullaιcount is蕗ivenby Kwan J inRe Goldlory Restaurant Ltd. n. 52 above. 
62 Ibid. at para 38. 
63 Ibid. at 仰向 22.For details as to when the subsidy is paid. s日epara 23. 
64 See n. 60 above. The吉山sidycovers both remun記rationand expense話。fthe liquidator. 
ら5The Audit COITInUsion Report. n‘48 above. in App日ndixE gave figures relating al completed winding-up c品$怒sbetween June 19事2and March 
1999. The total numberof windings-up was 1，700: in 1.364 cas出 theasets did not cxceed HK$ 50.000; in 218 cases the asets wer詑between
HK$SO.OOO and HK$200.000; whilst in only 118 cases did the asets exc閃 dHK$200，000， Accordingly， inover 85% of al summary cases. 
the asets were negligible (i.e， within the <HK$ 50，000 group). The estimated fes of the ORO administering these c敏総swas HK$86， 9 milion， 
although the asets tota!ed only HK$ 3.7 million - 出aver誌gein termsof costs of HK$63，70宮andin termsof asets of HK$2.713 per印 se，The
q紋iva!entfigures for eases where the asets were between HK$50.000 and HK$200.000 were (約costsof HK$ 35，2 milion; and (b) asets of 
HK$17 milion: the averages working out at HK事161.468(costs) and HK事77，981(a終結ts)，
るら Sethe figures given in n， 65 above. 
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and if further assets are uncovered as a result of such 
investigations， a decision can then be taken as to the 
merits of pursuing relevant parties， But， itis the 85% 
。fcases i.e. the vast majority which give rise to the 
greatest concern. 
However， itis plain that Panel T has been a鍛 assive
success in ter聖msof savings to the government purse， 
particularly as the number of compulsories more than 
doubled during the Asian financial crisis: from roughly 
500 cases each year in 1996 and 1997， to over 1，000 
in 2001. over 1.200 in 2002 and 2003 and only be-
gan to decline in late 2004.67 Two further points must 
be noted. Although the increase in the number of 
windings up is considerable， it pales almost into insi絞
nific制 1cein comparison to the匂ureson bankruptcy.釜 In
1998 there were 900 bankruptcies in Hong Kong. That 
figure more than tripled in 1999， rose to over 9，000 
during 2001 and over 25，000 by the end of 2002. The 
numbers fel only slightiy in 2003， dropped to 13，000 
in 2004 and have remained fairly steady at around 
10，000 p.a. since then.柑 Moreover，until recently， the 
contracting out of barロ1訟むrupt伐cyc設儲se郡芸 wasrロ10tan opμti初or蕊1 
under t出hethen legislation i泊np詳la配Cε
saying t出ha瓜tthe οE武tοwa悶日， from 1999 onwards. under 
extraordinary pressure in terms of workload， at設 time
when government income had taken a beating because 
of the economic downturn. Second， as one might 
expect， the legislature was insisting upon savings in 
virtually al areas of government activity and regula-
tion. For instance， the Public Accounts Committee of 
the Legislative Counci¥ in June 2000 expressed ‘grave 
concern' as the acεumu!ated operating deficit of the 
ORO， as well as 'serious dismay' as to a number of a芸術
pects of the managemen t procedures of the ORo. 70 The 
Public Accounts Committee strongly favoured greater 
competitive bidding.71 Howevξζcost cutting should not 
be the main objective of an insolvency system. It is par-
ticularly relevant to observe that the Public Accounts 
Committ侃 'sReport contains no reference at al to the 
phrase 'corporate governance¥ 
国国語置
ら7See Table A. above. 
1. The level of investigation in Panel Tとases
One must surely question whether a subsidy as low as 
HK$ 3，100 (on average) can possibly be expected to fund 
the amount of time required to conduct the ‘minimum 
level of statutory investigation'72 that used to require 
funding of the ORO in the region of HK$80，000 per 
case and for which the Official Receiver， at one time， 
might pay private practitioners some HK$60，OOO.73 
In this context， itis worth noting that， before the 
current tender arrangements were estab!ished and 
nearly al liquidations were dealt with in-house， the 
ORO had appointed an agent to coUect book debts owed 
to compani記事 inliquidation. The agent's fee (in 1996-
99) was HK$3，000 per case， merely for泌tempting
to collect book debts: and even at that time the agent 
制服 従edthat it made a loss. because of the time that 
had to be spent going through large quantities of docu叩
ments.74 Moreover. it should not be thought that Panel 
T is restricted to particularly straightforward summary 
cases: aU summary cases have， for several years， been 
parceled out under the Panel T scheme. In addition. 
Pane¥ T is not a true ‘cab rank' scheme， under which 
larger (remunerative) cases effectively subsidise unprof-
itable事smallercases: 75 thεtruly remunerative cases are， 
of course， dealt with quite separately under Pane¥ A. 
Concerns as to the level of investigation in insolvency 
cases in Hong Kong設reby no means new， having been 
highlighted in a Consultant's Report into the Role of the 
Official Receiver's Oftice as long ago as June 2002:76 
‘There is no evidence to suggεst that the HKORO or 
PIPs [private insolvency practitioners] are deficient 
in carrying out statutory enquiries …However. our 
interview round indicatedαgeneral perception thαt insuf-
ficient resources and concentration are pαid to this aspect 
均boththe HKORO and PIPs.' 
The Report continues: 7 
・Thereservations openly expressed by the LRC in this 
regard， and the associated comments of the Hong 
68 The figures are available via the ORO website. se氾 <www.oro・gov.hk/eng/stat/stat.htm>金
69 TheBan主ruptcy(Amendment) Rules 2007 were gazetted on 15 June 2007. Hong Kong Gov.むrnmentGazette， Legal SupplemむntN仏 2.L~123
Thξ2007 Rules enable the implementation of the Bankruptcy (Am開 dment)Ordinance 200乞themain purpose of which was to provide the 
necessary framewor主forprivate insolvency practitioners to serv.芭astrustes in summary ban主ruptcycase払
70 PI¥C Report， paraる3.
71 lbid. The PAC Report folりwedthe Audit Commission Report on the ORO. se n. 48 above. The Audit Commission Report noted. at para 8.2， that: 
'It is government policy that fes charged by the Governmentぬoulding巴neralbes記i後tlevels which can recover the ful cost of providing such 
services. However. the ORO h泊sa long history of not being able to recover fuly its op記ratingcosts.' 
72 Se日textto n. 55 above 
73 See text to n. 54 above. 
74 PAC Report事 para41. 
75 Although， from time to time， a summary case m説yr官官官註1(unexpecteぶsu泌総ntialasets out of which fes in that case may be paid. se text to 
n.らぎ above.
76 Consultant's Report. at par註 5.8I，emphasis added). Arthur Andersen was the consultant The Report is available on-liね記 at<www.info.go主hkl
archive/consuil/2002/0ro噌 .pdf>.
77 lbid. at para 5.守(footnotesomittedl認すhe必breviation'LRC' refers to the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong which in 1999 issued a 
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Kong Association of Banks， reinforce this view. They 
suggest that a combination of inadequate resources 
and commercial pressures認可resultin a lower level 
of investigatory effort than is generally desired by the 
market. The level of prosecutions and disqualifica雌
tions…may also reinforce public perceptions of low 
or superficiallevels of investigatory activity by both 
HKORO and PIPs.' 
The Consultant recommended78 that both ・themini-
mum level of enquiry should be increased in summary 
cases' and that a specialist investigations unit should be 
set up by the ORO.79 Both of these recommendations re削
ceived clear public support in the consultation exercise 
following publication of the Consultant's report.80 But 
neither of these recommendations h部 beentaken up by 
government. Moreover， ifinvestigations were lacking， 
or perceived削 lacking.at the time of the publication 
of the Consultant's Report in June 200乙whatmustbe
the situation now in light of the continuing decrease， 
with every tender exercise， in the subsidy paid for each 
summary case? 
The Consultant also commented that the introduc刷
tion of guidance notes， indicating a suggested level of 
inquiry in insolvencies. might reinforce the importance 
of adequate investigations.81 In late 2005， a number 
of non-statutory Insolvency Guidance Notes はGNs')
were published for the benefit of members of the Hong 
Kong Instituie of Certi銭edPublic Accountants.82 The 
IGNs draw upon the corresponding Statements of In-
solvency Practice (‘SIPs') issued to licensed insolvency 
practitioners in the UK. The IGNs are general in their 
scope and draw no distinction between Panel T cases 
and other liquidations in which a private practitioner 
is appointed. ln relation to investigations， IGN 2 (注Liq-
uidator's Investigation into the Affairs of an Insolvent 
Company') and IGN 4 ('Disqualification of Directors 
-盟国
-Statutory Reports')則的rbe noted. IGN 2 refers to a 
'minimum standard procedure' in respect of investi伊 "
tions‘whether there are assets or not'. 83 Reference to a 
couple of extracts gives a clear idea of what this冶 iniω
mum standard' is expected to involve:H4 
‘1¥t the outset of the winding-up， al relevant directors， 
including directors who held office during the last 
three years. the company secretary and other senior 
officials should be questioned as to the company's 
affaIrs. including the reasons for failure …Where 
appropriate. the liquidator may also .wish to invite 
creditors to bring to his notice any particular matters 
which they consider require further investigation.' 
'The records of the company covering a minimum 
of出εprevioustwo years (subject to availability) 
…should be examined to ensure material transac-
tions in the final period of trading were made in the 
normal course of business …This examination may 
include a review of the generalledger， for unusual 
transactions， paying particular attention to direc10r 
and related-party accounts. The accounting ledg綱
引 smay also be reviewed in conjunction with cash 
books， ban主statementsand cheque books. and ma-
teri設1amounts vouched to one another …Wherethe 
liquidator cannot obtain accounting records for the 
period prior to liquidation from the company，ωル
sideration should be given to obtaining records from 
other sources， wherever it is reasonably practicable 
to do so.' 
No doubt such matters are standard practice for any 
responsible practitioner in most零 ifnot al， jurisdic幽
tions. In addition. it will be noted that IGN 4 requires 
that much more than superficial attention wHl be given 
to the directors' disqualification reports戸Themystery，事
as far as these authors are concerned. is how anything 
Report on the Winding up Provisions of the Companies Ordinance (availぬいほ <www.h主reform.gov.hk/en/publiむ盆tions/rwind.htm>1. The 
view of thc Hong Kong Assoむiationof B註民主宰， in its submission in 1 YヲYto the LRC. was that investigations泌総 theafair目。fan insolvεnt 
eompany to expose malpractice‘ぬouldnot be fund日dfrom an insolvent company's制 setson the basis that it had never been accepted that the 
victim paid for the inv記stigationof the crime: (para 11.41 ofthe 1999 Report). 
78 Consultant's Report. n. 76 above. paras 5.24 -5.25. 
79 The proposed investigations unit would deal with: (i) potentially contentious cases. that should be reぬinedin-house from thc outset: and (i) 
tender cases appropri後telyreferred back to the unit by private practilioners. 
80 The outcome of the puるおじconsultationexercisewas reported to the Legislative Council Panel on Financial Affairs in February 2003 (document 
CB(l) 907/0ふ(3/05)，seeparas 18-19. The document is av註謀総i苦渋<www.legco.gov.h主lyrOふり3/englishl抑 n控除Ifa/papers/fa0219cbl-907
-.5e.pdf>. 
81 Consultant's Report， n.76 above， para 5.28. 
82 Such notes arc not binding on norトmembersof the In詰titute.such as solicitors appointed to Panel T ca訪日s.
83 IG災之，para 3. Para 4 states: 'The purpose ot号 aninvestigation is to determine the asets and li註b誌IUes()f the company and lO rcvicw the conduct. 
decisions and actions of the directors. r， during the course of the investigation any apparent preferences， dispositions of property after the 
commencement of the winding心 p.or rights of action come to Iight. the liquid出 lrshould determine. if n昔cessarywith the bene詰tof legal 
advise. wh詰theror not any particular transaction can be set aside.' 
84 lbid. paras 6品nd8.
8号TheORO may pay a li司uidatorfor work carried out at the request of thc ORO beyond that specified in IG，'Il2 (s巴eIGN4，p説ra2ら).'The submission 
01' reports or returns註ndthe provision of information on the fitnes of directors are statutory duties that must bεundertaken by any member 
accepting a relevant liquidation (or receivership) appoIntment. The OR has no oblig註tionto pay for such worふalthoロghthe relevant costs are， 
in principle. payable out of the asets of the company...' (IGN4， para 27). 
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approaching this levεI. or any appropriate leveI. of in明
vestigation can be conducted for a subsidy of US$400 
per case. 
In之002the Consultant also raised a question as to 
the effectiveness of the operation of the directors' dis脚
qualification regime in Hong Kong.'仏 Thispoint is， it is 
suggested， a relevant one. since directors' disqualifica-
tion is an area where Hong Kong cIosely followedx7 the 
1986じKreforms (and， as has already been noted. has 
since late 2005 the松nefitof a guidance note modeIed 
on SIP 41. The Consultant observed8X that the vast mゃ
jority of disqualifications was based upon ‘おむcounting
omission' offences and noted that the severity of orders 
made by the courts in Hong Kong appeared to be sig-
nificantly less than in the L'K:約
'The average disqualification period awarded in 
之001102was just over 3 years . two awards were 
made for 6 years and one for 8 years. By comparison. 
of the 1，540 disqualification awards made in the UK 
in 1999/2000. 44% were in excess of 6 years， and 
37 cases in excess of 10 years.' 
However. the period of disqualification is. of course. a 
matter for the courts rather than the ORO. ln addition， 
the Hong Kong legislation differs from the UK. in that 
the minimum period of disqualification for unfitness in 
Hong Kong is only one yとar9n(rather than two years) 
Thus， it could fairly be said， although it was not noted 
by the Consultant， t抗議tthe Hong Kong legislature has 
given the lead in promoting a more lenient penalty 図鑑
gime in comparison to the UK. In any event， the average 
period of disqualification in Hong Kong has increased 
somewhat from 3.40 in 2002 to 4.02 in 2006: and， in 
2006， for the first time. the number of unfitness dis柵
qualification orders made by the courts reached a total 
of 60.91 
The Consultant did not specifically comment on the 
number of disqualification orders made. which， from 
the investigation perspective事 ismore relevant than the 
period of disqualification imposed. Although compari“ 
sons are not exact. and Disraeli's words must always be 
borne in mind， the statistics are worth noting. In very 
general terms. if there are き，000compulsories in the 
UK，92 one may expect in the region of 1，2ヨodisqualifi-
cation orders -a ratio of 4: 1. In Hong Kong. iur every 
据躍冨田
持{)Consultant's Report. n. 76 abovε. paras 5.15 -5.18 
1.000 compulsories戸 therehave historically been 50 
disqualificationorders made-aratio of 20:1. Of course. 
some disqualification orders will be made in CVL cases， 
although commonsense would suggest that unfitness is 
pεrhaps more likeIy to be found in compulsory cases. If 
CVL numbers are incIuded. theむ豆 ratiois somewhere 
in the region of 12:1 and the Hong Kong ratio moves 
to 24:1. Accordingly， even if CVLs are included. there 
would appear to be a significant difference in the like¥i-
hood of disqualification procεedings being initiated 
and successfully pursued. It cannot be denied that such 
statistics could. at least in theory， be interpreted as 
suggesting that Hong Kong directors are simply better 
behaved and more responsible than their CK counter剛
parts. But such an interpretation might even cause 
Disraeli to blanch! Certainly， such an interpretation 
would be a bold one and not one which is supported by 
the relative paucity of CVLs in Hong Kong.94 
C. The way forward 
The key question the authors have sought to raise in this 
article is whether the current administrative arrange-
ments in place in Hong Kong militate against adequate 
investigations being conducted into summary cases， 
Le. the majority of al corporate insolvencies. In the 
authors' opinion， the answer is a resounding 'Yes'. The 
authors have particularly in mind the 8 5% of summary 
cases wherεthe company h部 noor virtually no assets. 
The present situation， it is suggested， seriously impacts 
on corporate governance in Hong Kong. Further， it is 
important to bear in mind that the distinction between 
summary and non-summary cases is arbitrary; and 
no one could suggest that non剛 summarycases are 
inherently more deserving of an adequate investiga幽
tion than summary cases. In addition， an insolvent， 
loss-making company might today have assets of. for 
example. HK$400，OOO and if a petition were presented 
today (and a winding酬 upordぽ madein reasonably 
short order) the amount of assets might be expected 
to be sufficient for the case to fal within the Panel A 
scheme -with the consequence that a basic level of 
investigation would be assured. Yet， ifthat same com層
pany's directors can put off the most pressing creditors 
87 The provisions in the CO on directors' disqlali註cationwere am日ndedin 19手企 basedc10sely upon Company Directors Disqualification Act 
198ら(UK).
88 Consultant's Report. n. 76 above， para 5.16. 
8ラlbid.para 5.17. 
90 CO.ι16議H(4).
91 The statistics are available at <w官w.oro.gov.hkl巴ng/statlpdf/disq_stat.pdf>ー
92μ。主ing喧 ingeneral terms. at disqualification statistics in the l'K befofεdisqualification 01' directors by undertaking came into oper絞め礼 For
the figUf;巴s.se <www.insolvency.gov.lIk/ff;日記domo訪日前)fmationldu/ annuald l.doc>. 
93 Se n. 91 above for details. 
94 Se t日xtto n. 9 above. 
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。rin a similar manner delay the 阪 lrkers'progress 
through thεgood offices of the Labour Department and 
Labour Tribunal and bat onおron extra few months. 
the level of assets関設ywell have declined well below the 
HK5i200.000 threshold. with the consequence that the 
case will drop into what may perhaps not unfairly be 
termed the ‘b訂 gainbasement' investigation category. 
lt would be more than a litle naive to think that al 
company directors are unaware of the present Hong 
Kong realities although there can be no way of telling 
how many directors deliberately c設usetheir company's 
assets to be almost wholly extinguished. whether by 
continuing to trade at a loss or other yet more ques-
tionable means. before winding-up proceedings are 
eventually commenεed against the company. 
The authors do not subscribe to the view that a 
tougher investigative and regulatory regime i.e壷 d
proper enforcement of existing laws would serve litle 
useful purpose and make no difference at the end of the 
de写 Recentexamples in Hong Kong make it clear that 
stricter enforcεment may lead to significant changes 
in behaviour by directors of financially troubled com-
panies. In response to a number of suspected cases 
of abuse of the pwrF by employers. often involving 
restaurants under the same manag<εment opening and 
closing rapidly. an inter白 departmentaltask force was 
set up in November 2002.9号 Thetask force not only 
looked into cases where claims were made on the Fund 
but later also. particularly in relation to the catering 
industry， took preモmptiviεmeasuresto forestall busi-
nesses closing down owing substantial amounts of 
wages to wor恥は Governmentofficials have claimed 
considerable success not just in relation to higher 
levels of prosecutions (for wage offences) but. more 
significantly. in promoting more responsible behaviour 
by business owners.鞘 Undoubtedly.there have been 
many cases where the PWIF has been abused and 
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the government's initiatives ha問 hadresults. but this 
serves to highlight two points: firstly. that the ordinary 
insolvency arrangements. including the contracting 
out of summary cases. were not working properly in 
terms of detecting and preventing abuse; and. second. 
that there is a crying need for more in depth investiga欄
tions in cases where the P¥杭 Fis not being abused but 
directors are guilty of unfit behaviour. 
Changes in the legal fram在主主Torkmight also go some 
way to improving directors' conduct. 1n this context it 
may be noted that there have been renewed calls， both 
inside97 the Legislative Council and without，91i for the 
introduction of a law on insolvent trading.判 Other
changes could be considered. For instance. the mini酬
mum period of disqualification for unfitness. currently 
one year.1∞could be increased to two years thereby 
sending a clear message to the courts that penalties 
need to be increased. A rebuttable presumption of uル
fitness could be introduced into the legislation where 
a person has been a director (including shadow direc-
tor) of two or more companies which have gone into 
insolvent compulsory liquidation within a five-year 
period.101 The court could also be given a power when 
makingαdisqualification order on the ground of unfitness. 
to further penalize a director by requiring him to repay 
al or any part of the remuneration paid by the company 
to that dirεctor in the six months prior to the com-
mencement of the winding-up. (It would be a defence 
for the director to prove that he had acted reasonably 
and taken appropriate steps to minimise losses to credi-
tors during the six-month period.)102 This change in 
the law would tackle the apparently common situation 
in Hong Kong. where directors trade on and on (draw明
ing自alary)as long as possible even though there is no 
realistic chance of the business being saved. Moreover， 
giving the court m誌 inga disqualification order such 
an additional power would avoid the problem of the 
95 The Taskforce combined expertis巴fromth日LD，the ORO. the LAD and the Commercial Crime Bureau of the Hong Kon蕗PoliceForce: se PWIF 
Annual Rε~port 2002-。王 p.12. se wwwJabour.gov.h主/εng/publiclwcp/Annu説lR巴port02-03.pdl'.On話。fthe two areas of suspected註buse
glVeお話pecialattention h註5been the . ile蕗altransfer of asets昌nd/orother acts on the part 01' the director or responsible persons of説company
to defraud creditors bεfore the closure of the companダ(Pr巴ventionof Abuse of the Protection of W註geson Insolvency Pund. Legislative 
Council Paねelon M註npo昨日r，LC Paper ;¥10. (沿(2)653/0雪心品(03).15December 2005. para 4. av誌ilableat < www.labour.go杭hkieng/legc口/
pdf/MP151205(PWIF)♂df>). 
96 According to Mr Ip Shuぷwan.thむSecretaryfor Economic Deve!opment and Lめour.spe註主ingto the Legislative Council. 11 January 200品:
九partfrom stepping up prosecution. wεar日nowtargeting our investig呂tionson restaurants that may have problems. In fact. the catering 
industry has already made a lot of irnprovement . aftcr adopting a rnulti-pronged and proactive approach， our work has shown rewarding 
results…During thεthird quarter of last year. the number of resta註rantemployees submitting applications to the PWIF had dropped by 34%. 
and the decreasむhadeven amounted to 79% in thc fourth quarter. This fuly iIustrates that our work has been very efective.' For further dゃ
tails. se LC Pap記rNo.CB(之)653/0らむら(03).Preven!ion of Abusc of the Protection 01' Wag記Son Insolvency Pund. n争.5above. paras 20-21 
守7See' Insolvency Fund Protection Measures Proposed¥Hong Kong Government Press Rele品Sε.26April2005 <www.news.gov.h主将nI category i 
atschoollO 5042らIhtm1i050426en02006.h恥tm>.
98 S 吉総e
9 守P針3汁ro、visi回O註凶sりni泊r口lsolve抗叩nttradi瓜I尽19v官Vむr凶cαωm(勾正a![αle杭吋dinBi自1伝si泊n2000 arロJd2(の)01.s絞t伐er設1.20above. 
100 Seen. 90above圃
10J Cf the (Australian) Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)， s. 206D‘ 
102 Jn other words. a sort of 'light' insolvent trading r記gime.Although any such regime would need to be carefully constructed. to ensure that a 
defendant was not ambushed by an unexpected rep乱ymentorder. 
Philp Smart， St母phenBrisζoe and Ch乱rlesD， Booth 
funding of insolvent trading proceedings brought 
by a liquidator. Another possibility is that the law on 
statutory derivative actions， brought into force in Hong 
Kongin之005，lOlcould be amended to allow， in speci-
fied circumstances， a creditor of an insolvent company 
to initiate proceεdings against a defaulting director. 
However， there is always the likelihood that any legislル
tive changes will amount to litle more than window 
dressing， unless an adequate level of investigation by 
way of the liquidation process is first assured. 
Undoubtedly. one troublesome issue that has to 
be addressed is who is to p訟yfor an adequate level of 
investigation by the liquidator. Some legislators and 
policy-makers in government appeaゑ inthe recent 
past. to have expected that the ful cost of administer-
ing Hong Kong's insolvency regime will be paid for out 
of the ORO's income.104 Yet such an approach is， as the 
Hong Kong Association of Banks has pointed out， as 
il幽 conceivedas suggesting that the victims of crime 
should pay for the costs of poHce investigations. H行 In
addition， it should not be overlooked th設tfunding ques-
tions -even full-cost recovery -are influenced by the 
structure of government departments. For instance， 
at present the Companies Registry generates a healthy 
surplus， 11令 whilethe ORO operates at a deficit. Yet. if 
the government structure were different. and there 
were a single‘Company and Insolvency Service¥the 
profit from the registration side could quite reasonably， 
in these authors' opinion， be used to subsidise the insol朝
刊 ncyside. Moreover， itmay be recalled that until June 
1992， the Companies Registry and Insolvency Service 
were part of one larger department: the Registrar Geト
eral's Departmen仁川7
At a more generallevel. the great benefit to those traゐ
ing by way of a limited liability company is that their 
liability is limited. Yet it has always been accepted that 
there is a price to pay for this benefit: a level of public 
disclosure and scrutiny. Further， the limited liability of 
the separate entity created upon incorporation may not 
matter greatly to creditors or directors until insolvency 
intervenes.10H It is not unreasonable as a matter of pri仔
ciple that those who wish to trade with the benefit 01' 
limited liability should fund， by way of registration and 
量盟罵橿
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other flξes whilst their businesses are going concerns， a 
portion of the costs that arise when， as inevitably hap刷
pens in any economy. some companies fail. In short. 
the contention that Hong Kong's corporate insolvency 
regime. currently administered by the ORO， should be 
self.ωfunding is totally without merit.おlomonv Salomon 
EプCoLtdlU9 did not constitute a rogue's charter. at least 
in part， becぉusepropεrinvestigations consequent upon 
a company's failure and windingぺlpmeant that those 
who abused the rules could be brought to book.11O This 
crucial consideration， a cornerstone of moderu comω 
pany law， appears to have been largely lost in the recent 
drive to cut down the ORO's costs. 
In general terms， an increωed level of investigation 
might be expected to lead to: (i) greater creditor recov-
ery; and (i) at least in the near term， greater detection of 
unlawful or inappropriate behaviour by directors (e.g. 
unfitness). The authors' beHef is that the latter is not 
only more likely but also more significant. For improved 
corporate governance， by way of proper enforcemε針
。fexisting laws， is surely in the broader interests of the 
commercial community. It is the authors' hope that in 
the longer term， the greater certainty of the enforce剛
mentofεxisting laws will act as a deterrent on unlawful 
or inappropriate behaviour by directors which， in turn， 
might well lead to greater creditor recovery in many 
C泌総s.The tirne has組 relycome for， at the very least， 
reconsideration of the Consultant's 2002 recom叩
mendation that a specialist investigations unit should 
be established to deal with: (i) potentially contentious 
cases， that should be retained in-house from the outset: 
and (i) tender cases appropriately referred back to the 
unit by private practitioners. 111 
However， decisions on levels of investigation and 
sources of funding must， it is suggested， be informed祢
ねtaon the sorts of benefits that can be expect付 from
increased levels of investigation. It is suggested that a 
selectIon of recent Panel T cases needs to be re-visited 
andre側 examined.For instance， 60 Panel T cases should 
be randomly selected and divided into 3 batches (of 20 
each). Each batch would be re剛 examined，blind. The 
蜘stbatch would be allocated up to 30 billable hours 
of investigation: the second batch up to 60 hOUfS and 
104 For exampJe. PAC Report. para 61 : '.，.Auditωnsidered that the adoption of the fut¥ cost of Insolvency administration as a basis for determin-
Ingth告festo be changed by th日OROprovided a more reasonable and equitable appruach".: See also ibぷ.para 63. 
10きSen. i7 above， 
106 The Companies Registry Annual Report 2005-06， p， 5. reveaJs a 'record surplus' of HK$114.1 milion for the year. (Se <w研rW.cr.go忘れ主/en/
publications/ docs/ 2006/02 ，pdf> 
107 SeePAC 浪記port.n. 70 abov巴.at para 24. 
lOH Se地.e.g・， per Robert Walker J inRe PO立'yPeck InternationaJ plc [1号ザh1 2 AI ER 433 at 444， citing Lord Wilberforce in Ford b Carter Ltd v Midland 
BankLtd(l守79)12守災LJ543 at 544. 
109 [lH97] AC 22 
110 島知reover.the most vulnerable creditors. namely workers， might be protected 1予ystatutory schemes (8uch a8 lnder the PWIF in Hong 
Kongト
111 See tむxtto n. 78-詰()above. 
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the third batch up to 90 hours. The rゃexaminedcases 
should then be analysed in terms of whether they un-
cover prima facie evidence of: (i) fraud or dishonesty; 
(i) breaches of the CO; and (ii) unfitness on the part 
of the directors. The results can then be compared 
with the findings in the original Panel T investigations. 
(The exte蹴 towhich increased investigation may lead 
to greater creditor recovery can be assessed in a like 
manner.) Conclusions can then be drawn. firstly， as 
to whether current Panel T arrangements are failing 
in terms of corporate governance;1l2 and， second. if 
increased investigation leads to improved detection 
of unaccεptable behaviour by directors， what level of 
investigation is most suitable in terms of overall cost/ 
benefit. 
Of course. the suggested pilot studj乙howeverstruc-
tured， will have to be funded and will require a budget 
of a perhaps as much as a few. or even several. million 
Hong Kong dollars. But it is difficult to see how such a 
sum can be a genuine obstacle when it is borne in mind 
that: (i) the government's overall設nancialis extremely 
robust at present. e.g. the Companies Registry for the year 
ending 31 March 2006 madeぉsurplusof HK$1l4.1 
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million; 1， and (i) the budget for the 2002 Consultant's 
Report ran to several million Hong Kong dollars (at a 
time when the economy was severely depressed).114 
The outcome of any such pilot study should not be 
pre-judged. It might conεeivably be出atincreased irト
vestigations produce nothing more than current Panel 
T arrangements -although the authors would be aston綱
ished， recalling that even 5 years ago the Consultant's 
cal for greater attention to be given to investigations 
received widespread support. 15 But if the results were 
to indicate that existing laws are simply not being 
adequately enforced， this would provide powerful am何
munition against those who might claim -as is almost 
invariably the case in Hong Kong -that any change 
wouldbe ‘anti-business' . 
In sum. it is contended that history， commonsense 
and such anecdotal evidence as is available. strongly 
indicate that the present Panel T arrangements amount 
to a significant failing in terms of effective corporate 
governance in Hong Kong. Reform is urgently required. 
The nature of that reform needs to be informed by ac叩
tual data on the effectiveness and governance benefits 
of increased levels of investigation and enforcement. 
113 Kote 10品above.Tbe over註1Government surplus for 200ら07wasHK幸三ら，話bilion:Soutfz Cfzina Morning Post事 1らJulyア之007.News. p. L 
114 ThePACR官port.仏?のめりも宣告。 para19. reveals that a sum of HK$8 milion w邑searmarked for thεconsullancy study. 
1ヨSetext to n. 80 above. 
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